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ABSTRACT: The ESREL conference welcomes a special session on ARAMIS European project. This session
represents halfway workshop of the project, which started in January 2002. The aim is to disseminate first re-
sults and collect comments from the public. This article is one of the five papers constituting the session and it
presents the overall frame of ARAMIS project. ARAMIS objective is to build up a new integrated risk as-
sessment method that will be used as a supportive tool to speed up the harmonized implementation of
SEVESO II Directive. The proposed method results in an integrated risk index composed itself of three inde-
pendent indexes. Index 1 assesses the consequence severity of first defined reference scenarios. Index 2 evalu-
ates Safety Management effectiveness and accounts thus for the scenario probability. Index 3 estimates the
environment vulnerability. Efforts have been made to disseminate work progress and results from the start. A
dedicated w eb-site h as b een c reated a nd a r eview c ommittee g athering i ndustry r isk e xperts a nd d ecision-
makers from EU competent authorities periodically monitors the project.
1 INTRODUCTION
ARAMIS project was accepted for funding in Febru-
ary 2001 by the European Commission, in the 5th
Framework Programme for Research and Techno-
logical Development, in the field of "Energy, Envi-
ronment and Sustainable Development", chapter en-
titled "Fight against major natural and technological
hazards". This three-year project started in January
2002. The project has been built in particular on the
conclusions and results of ASSURANCE and I-
RISK, two other European projects funded in the 4th
Framework Programme.
ASSURANCE stands for ASSessment of the Un-
certainties i n R isk A nalysis o f C hemical Establish-
ments. This project was a benchmark exercise,
which aimed at improving the understanding of the
sources and types of the uncertainties connected with
risk analyses. As a rough conclusion, the project
stated that the benchmark exercise revealed note-
worthy variation in the final results. Discrepancies
were p resent b oth i n t he a ssessment o f frequencies
and in the assessment of consequences. The different
results would have obviously affected the relevant
risk-informed decisions, mainly land use planning,
emergency planning and acceptability of risk.
The initial statement of I-RISK project -I for inte-
grated- was the idea that Quantitative Risk Assess-
ments (QRA) and safety management audits were so
far two separate tools and that would be valuable to
integrate both to address major hazard management.
In this respect, the main objective was first to de-
velop a management model for risk control and
monitoring, then to implement this model into a dy-
namic QRA tool. Conclusions of the project point
out that the integrated technical and management
model was very robust and helped audit organiza-
tions in a new way. However it also turned out that a
full-scale site integrated QRA was too time and de-
tail demanding, so not currently practical or relevant.
From both projects, but also from everyone's ex-
perience in his own country, it emerges the need for
a methodology giving consistent rules to identify ac-
cident scenarios and taking into account both pre-
vention and mitigation measures peculiar to each
plant operator. Those safety measures are obviously
controlled in a safety management system.
There is also an underlying need for a risk as-
sessment method that could reach a consensus
amongst risk experts from b oth Industry and C om-
petent Authorities and then be used with reduced un-
certainty to make risk-informed decisions. The
ARAMIS project has been set up to propose solu-
tions to both latter requirements.
The paper first recalls the context of major acci-
dent hazards prevention in the EU. ARAMIS overall
objectives are then expressed and the work contents
are described in details. As a conclusion, the ex-
pected impacts of such a methodology are addressed.
2 CONTEXT OF THE SEVESOII DIRECTIVE
The annual report from the European Environment
Agency (1999) indicates, among others, that the
trend in notified accidents has been constant over the
last twenty years. This statement alone shows that
many of the often seemingly simple "lessons
learned" from accidents have not been yet enough
implemented in industry's standards. There is un-
fortunately no doubt that disasters will continue to
occur throughout the EU. Some will be due to tech-
nology, some to the hazards of nature. The problem
of low-probability, high-consequence accidents is
likely to remain a key issue in terms of risk man-
agement. Nevertheless, hazards have to be managed
and risks can be reduced.
The most significant EU Directive to help protect
people and the environment from major accident
hazards is the SEVESO II Directive. This applies to
industries that use "significant amounts of hazardous
substances". Their operators must demonstrate in
particular they apply a major accident prevention
policy and they implemented appropriate prevention
and mitigation measures controlled and monitored in
a safety management system.
The SEVESO II Directive sets very clear objec-
tives relating to major hazard management, but the
remaining question is: how to reach them and to
control they are reached? For instance, there is no
harmonized definition of the scenarios to be consid-
ered for risk assessment. The ASSURANCE project
showed in this way that the chosen scenarios
(BLEVE, full bore rupture or small leakage, amount
of substance caught in an explosion, etc.) are differ-
ent according to the experts judgement and experi-
ence, and according to the deterministic or risk-
based approach of the Member State applying the
Directive. Moreover, constraints in land-use plan-
ning (Cassidy & Amendola, 1999) sometimes urge
the operators to consider reduction of the safety
zones by choosing "realistic" scenarios and ac-
counting for the effectiveness of dedicated safety de-
vices. Actually the lack of rules for identifying sce-
narios and carrying out risk assessment makes often
the expert's job tricky and largely too subjective to
base transparent risk-informed decisions on it.
In addition to uncertainties in risk analyses, dif-
ferences of culture among the Member States result
in a multiplicity of methods and approaches
(Kirchsteiger, 1999). At a recent JRC International
Workshop (Kirchsteiger & Cojazzi, 2000), most
participants agreed that comparative risk assessment
along harmonized procedures would significantly
help the decision understanding. A harmonized risk
assessment methodology would thus ensure that
risk-based decision making provides the necessary
transparency and the right balance between scientific
understanding and principle of precaution.
Proposing a harmonized methodology for risk as-
sessment is a tough and tricky task. However, deter-
ministic and probabilistic approaches should not be
opposed since they are often complementary (Lib-
mann, 1996). From a historical point of view, deter-
ministic methods first allow to check the safe design
of an installation. Probabilistic methods help then
evaluate the residual risk of the installation. Both
approaches have their strengths and weaknesses
(Hourtolou, 2002). A first basic idea of ARAMIS is
to take advantage of each approach's strengths and
to develop upon it an alternative semi-quantitative
method based on the evaluation of the safety barriers
-lines of defense- peculiar to each site.
3 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of the ARAMIS project is to cre-
ate a new integrated risk assessment methodology by
combining the strengths of different methods cur-
rently used in European Countries. Accordingly, the
method should be flexible enough to account for dif-
ferent national cultures like deterministic or risk-
based approaches, in order to become a recom-
mended tool used by risk experts and endorsed by
risk decision makers in the whole EU.
The proposed method in ARAMIS should allow
to characterize an integrated risk index composed it-
self of three distinct and independent indexes. Index
1 is to assess the consequence severity of first de-
fined reference scenarios. Index 2 is to evaluate pre-
vention management effectiveness, which allows
thus to account for the reference scenarios probabil-
ity in a semi-quantitative manner. Index 3 is to esti-
mate the environment vulnerability by evaluating the
sensitivity of potential targets located in the vicinity
of a SEVESO plant.
Industrial UNIT
Ù






: (Major Accident \
] Prevention Policy) j
re( RL~F(Sref;M;V)
Figure 1. ARAMIS methodology representation
The project has been set up (Figure 1) to reflect
the logical construction of the risk index and has
been divided accordingly into work packages:
1 First goal is then to develop a method to identify
"reference" accident scenarios. These scenarios
are consensual "realistic" scenarios to be used in
SEVESO II safety report and taking account of
some prevention and mitigation measures of the
site according to their effectiveness.
2 Second task is to build up the integrated risk in-
dex made up of the three distinct indexes, i.e.:
- consequence severity evaluation,
- prevention management effectiveness,
- environment vulnerability estimation.
4 DESCRIPTION OF WORK
The work plan of the project has been built accord-
ing to the logical construction of the final resulting
risk index and it has been presented the same way in
this article.
Halfway through the life of the project, the newly
built methodology is to be tested on three SEVESO
industrial sites in Europe. At this stage, two new
partners from eastern-European countries will join
the consortium and will also test the full method as
totally unbiased end-users, each in one additional
test site of their own country.
Moreover and since ARAMIS is intended to be a
supportive tool to promote harmonized risk assess-
ments throughout Europe, the project leaves from
the start an extensive part to large exchanges with
potential end-users of the method. Identified end-
users are both industrial companies and Competent
Authorities in charge of enforcing SEVESO II Di-
rective. For that purpose, a dedicated Work Package
deals with valorization and dissemination of project
progress and results. Industrial partners have also
been directly included in the consortium and a Par-
allel Review Team gathering potential end-users has
been constituted.
4.1 WP1 : Scenario identification
Identification of the possible accident scenarios is a
key-point in risk assessment (Amendola & al.,
2002). However, especially in a deterministic ap-
proach, worst case scenarios are considered, often
without taking into account existing safety devices
and implemented safety policy. This approach can
lead to an overestimation of the risk level and does
not promote the implementation of safety systems.
The aim of this Work Package (Delvosalle & al.,
2003) is first to identify major accidents without
considering safety systems. A second step is then to
study in depth safety device effectiveness and safety
management efficiency, which will allow to assess -
qualitative- probabilities, in order to identify finally
Reference Accident Scenarios taking into account
some of the implemented safety systems.
The first objective is to define a Methodology for
the Identification of Major Accident Hazards (MI-
MAH). On the basis of considered equipment and
properties of handled chemicals, the methodology
must be able to predict which major accidents are
likely to occur. Properties of substances are found
out thanks to Directive 67/548/EEC (substance clas-
sification and labeling) and their own conditions of
use (pressure, temperature, flow, etc.).
The work has been divided in several parts.
Firstly, it was necessary to select a general approach.
The bow-tie method was chosen (Bellamy & Van
der Schaff, 1999) because it is a highly structured
tool and it is considered as a very good way to es-
tablish links with other parts of the project and espe-
cially Management Efficiency (Figure 2). Secondly,
a special effort was made to develop a common ty-
pology of equipment and hazardous substances.
Thirdly, event trees and fault trees centered on criti-
cal events have been built, and above all a method-
ology able to build generic trees was created. Critical
events are defined as "Loss of Containment" or
"Loss of Physical Integrity" event.
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Figure 2. Bow-tie approach for scenario identification
At this stage, the MEVIAH methodology is able to
predict which major accidents are likely to occur on
a given equipment. With the help of a deep study of
safety systems, causes of accidents and a historical
analysis of known accidents, the objective of the
work to be done is now to place lines of defense -
safety functions, safety barriers- on the different
branches of the trees. This will lead to a second
Methodology of Identification of Reference Accident
Scenarios (MIRAS) which has to take into account
some of the safety systems according to their effec-
tiveness. Therefore, the Reference Accident Scenar-
ios will use results from the work performed on the
prevention management effectiveness (Figure 3).
These scenarios are used afterwards as an input to
evaluate the severity index, i.e. the hazard potential.
O State of the art in policies
conception
- operation and control
- mitigation
O Lessons learnt from
accidents
Figure 3. Scenarios identification process
4.2 WP2 : Severity of the consequences
The objective of this task is to define a severity in-
dex S characterizing the possible consequences of
accident scenarios (Casal & al., 2003). hi this re-
spect, only the physical characteristics of the phe-
nomena involved in accidents are studied in order to
evaluate the severity of both major scenarios and
reference scenarios identified in WP1.
First task of WP2 was the selection of the most
suitable models for the calculation of the effects of
the various dangerous accidental phenomena. Thus,
a survey of the existing models for the calculation of
the effects due to explosions (overpressure and mis-
siles), fires (radiation), toxic clouds (concentration),
BLEVE-Fireballs (overpressure, missiles and radia-
tion), pollutant plumes into the water (concentra-
tion), soil pollution and domino effects is now avail-
able at this stage of the project.
The Severity Index must be independent of the
other two indexes. It is thus constructed in such a
way that every dangerous phenomenon has a corre-
sponding specific sub-index. The contribution of
each dangerous phenomenon to the global index S is
strongly related to the probability of occurrence of
the phenomenon associated to each critical event
(e.g. probability of ignition) and identified in the
WP1 event trees (Figure 2).
Each specific sub-index associated to the various
physical phenomena takes into account in its con-
struction the following parameters:
- the effect area concerned with the phenomenon,
e.g. a disc in case of an explosion, a plume sur-
_ face for gas dispersion ;
- the kinetic of the phenomenon: rapid for an ex-
plosion, much slower for a fire ;
- the potential of generating domino effect: frag-
ment emission, delayed phenomena triggered off.
The severity index S is therefore a function of pa-
rameters only associated with physical phenomena.
All the identified scenarios should then be evaluated
and ranked in this way according to the calculation
of So for Major Accident Hazards and Sref for Refer-
ence Accident Scenarios.
4.3 WP3 : Prevention management effectiveness
This work package deals with the assessment of
safety management efficiency and its effect on the
calculation of external risks for SEVESO plants
(Duijm & al., 2003).
The methodology is based on the identification of
initiating events and direct causes of the accident
scenarios (bow-tie approach). Safety barriers are
then related to generic fault and event trees repre-
senting all possible accident scenarios leading to
critical events (Figure 2). The safety organization in-
cludes both the adequacy and completeness of tech-
nical and managerial barriers (lines of defense) that
are implemented to prevent these accidents and the
management system that ensures that these barriers
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Figure 4. Structure of index M
The methodology recognizes a number of dimen-
sions of safety management ( delivery s ystems), d e-
rived from previous work on safety management
modeling, notably the I-Risk (Hale, 1998) and
MIRIAM (Plot, 2002) models. These are made ex-
plicit in specific functions that need to be executed
to maintain a safety barrier. Examples of these deliv-
ery systems are: ensuring good competence and
commitment of employees, manpower availability,
communication, procedures, plans, hardware and
human-machine interfaces.
Currently, the focus is on developing instruments
to measure the set of dimensions, using a combina-
tion of audit, questionnaire, interview and o bserva-
tion techniques. The combination of measurements
ensures that not only the implementation of func-
tions, but also its conditions and outcome (e.g. good
safety commitment of the employees) are taken into
account.
The measurement techniques address in particular
the specific safety functions (MLODI and MLOD2, Fig-
ure 4) found in a given establishment. However
measurement will also be carried out in a generic
way onsite (MSMS, Figure 4), assuming then the
quality of the dimensions represents a common
mode for the quality of safety barriers maintenance.
The efficiency of the barriers can then be adjusted
according to the measurement scores to select the fi-
nal set of Reference Accident Scenarios.
The assessment of technical barriers effectiveness
follows the principles described in the norms
IEC61508 and IEC61511 (Functional safety : safety
instrumented systems for the process sector). Among
these principles, effectiveness is analyzed through
the definition of "Safety Integrity Levels" linked to
device characteristics (design, reliability, maintain-
ability, testability...) and also through criteria upon
the activities in charge to maintain them.
Challenges in the development of the methodol-
ogy include the need to calibrate the. scores in the
measurement of dimensions, as well as the need to
determine the efficiency of technical barriers as a
function of these scores.
4.4 WP4 : Environment vulnerability
An installation handling dangerous substances is
hazardous only according to the potential of vulner-
able targets liable to be affected. In assessing the
overall risk level of a plant, it is therefore quite rele-
vant to characterize the spatial vulnerability of the
environment surrounding the plant. Such is the aim
of this work package (Tixier, 2003).
Vulnerability of the surroundings depends on the
features of the environment that are potential targets
(human, environmental and material) and on the type
of impact due to hazards (fire, explosion, and toxic
release). It also strongly depends on the considered
target area.
To address this issue, the area of interest in the
vicinity of a plant has been first divided into meshes
and the potential targets have been identified and lo-
calized with the support of Geographic Information
Systems (GIS). The major difficulty is then to rank
and prioritize the various sensitivities of the targets
according to the various expected impacts.
A suitable solution has been found out by apply-
ing a multi-criteria ranking approach, such as SA-
ATY methodology which allows to define priorities
from complex situations. At this stage of the project,
SAATY method has been extensively applied to the
concern of vulnerability estimation.
First step was to describe and classify potential
targets, hazards and impacts in adequate typologies.
Following step involved expert judgement. Through
experts' answers to specific questionnaires, SAATY
method helped build up mathematically the generic
coefficients of target vulnerability.
Final step will be to test and validate the calcu-
lated coefficients and resulting index through full-
scale case studies.
Thanks to the combined use of SAATY method
and GIS, index V should be represented as vulner-
ability maps of a plant surroundings, and should be-
come in this way a powerful tool for risk-informed
decision making.
4.5 WP5; Risk level integration and validation
4.5.1 Characterization of final Risk Level RL
The risk level RL of an installation in its environ-
ment is a function depending on the severity index S,




The objective of this phase is to study the relation
between S, M and V to characterize final risk level.
It will be decided at this stage whether the risk
level should remain characterized by 3 separate in-
dexes or whether the 3 indexes could be aggregated
into one single index.
4.5.2 Case studies
Halfway through the life of the project, five case
studies will be carried out with the collaboration of
five different SEVESO establishments throughout
Europe in order to test and validate or improve the
new methodology.
To select the test sites, it has been assured that
both countries with consequence-based and prob-
abilistic approaches would be represented. Moreover
two case studies out of five will take place in Slove-
nia and Czech Republic. Two institutes from these
countries will indeed join the consortium at this
stage and test the full method with the test sites.
Both of them will thus act as totally unbiased end-
users since they were not involved in the method de-
velopment.
After these full-scale exercises, the ARAMIS
methodology will be improved again and give rise to
its last version in the project.
5 WP6-7: VALORIZATION, DISSEMINATION
Since ARAMIS is intended to be a supportive tool to
promote harmonized risk assessments throughout
Europe, the project leaves from the start an extensive
part to large exchanges with potential end-users.
Identified end-users are both industrial companies
and Competent Authorities in charge of enforcing
SEVESO H Directive.
hi the valorization process, industrial end-users
are directly represented in the consortium through an
association of European industrial companies. This
helps the consortium to relay information about the
project progress and results, and to convince plants
for the case studies.
A Parallel Review Team gathering risk experts
from industry and EU competent authorities has also
been constituted. This review team gathers every six
months to monitor the project and thus to ensure
needs from end-users are indeed fulfilled and the fi-
nal approach will be widely accepted, ha this respect
their main comments concern the applicability and
usefulness of achieved results.
In the dissemination process, a dedicated web site
has been set up first: please visit http://aramis.jrc.it.
The web-site aims at promoting the project towards
the public and also works as a quick communication
tool among the partners. An electronic newsletter is
also released every six month on the web-site, in or-
der to get the public informed of work progress.
Two workshops were also planned during the
project. This article is part of the halfway workshop
held at the ESREL conference. A final workshop
will also take place at the end of the project to dis-
seminate main achievements to all relevant
stakeholders. Proceedings of the workshop will be
made available on the web-site.
6 CONSORTIUM DESCRIPTION AND
INVOLVEMENT
The consortium consists of twelve organizations ex-
pert in the field of risk analysis (Table 1). Nine part-
ners represent mostly research centers throughout
Europe. The last three institutes represent Newly As-
sociates States from Eastern Europe.
Table 1. Description of partner organization
Organization full name
1. Institut National de l'Environ-
nement Industriel et des Risques
Accidental Risk Division
2. European Commission - Joint
Research Centre - Institute for the
Protection and Security of the
Citizen - Major Accident Hazard
Bureau
3. Faculté Polytechnique de Mons
- Major Risk Research Center
4. Universitat Politecnica de
Catalunya - Centre for Studies on
Technological Risk (CERTEC)
5. Association pour la Recherche
et le Développement des Métho-
des et Processus Industriels
6. Ris0 National Laboratory
System Analysis Department
7. Universita di Roma
Dipartimento Ingegneria Chimica
8. Central Mining Institute
Safety Management and Techni-
cal Hazards
9. Delft University of Technology
- Safety Science Group
10. Institution of Chemical Engi-
neers European Process Safety
Centre
11. Jozef Stefan Institute - De-
partment of Inorganic Chemistry
and Technology
12. Technical University of Os-

































MERIS is the coordinator of the project. It has a
European expertise in the field of major accident
prevention. It works as technical support for the
French Ministry of Ecology in charge of SEVES O II
Directive application. In particular, it manages with
a steering committee the risk index aggregation and
validation phase. INERIS is also deeply involved in
the valorization and dissemination process.
EC-JRC-IPSC and especially MAHB has a rec-
ognized international expertise in the field of major
accident prevention. It animated EU Working
Groups dealing with the application of SEVESO Di-
rectives and is also experienced with accident data-
bases and GIS tools at a European level. MAHB is
WP leader of the dissemination activities and also
coordinates the Parallel Review Team.
FPMs-MRRC has a great experience in the appli-
cation of SEVESO Directives, and already devel-
oped methodologies and tools in the field of domino
effects and source term / consequence modeling.
MRRC is WP1 leader concerning scenario identifi-
cation and also brings its experience to WP2.
UPC-CERTEC has a recognized expertise in the
evaluation of accident consequences: dispersion, ex-
plosion, fire modeling. UPC is WP2 leader.
ARMINES is a consortium of research centers
from French school of mines. Three different re-
search teams take part in the ARAMIS project.
"Pôle Cindyniques" from Mines de Paris has built
up a debriefing and interview methodology to learn
better from both technical and organizational inci-
dents. By this means, Mines de Paris contributes to
develop ARAMIS organization model and manage-
ment effectiveness index.
"SITE" Center from Mines de Saint-Etienne has a
long experience in risk analysis and environmental
management system. In ARAMIS, this team mainly
focuses on developing generic "bow-ties" and an as-
sessment method for technical barrier effectiveness.
"LGEI" Laboratory from Mines d'Alès has devel-
oped a methodology based on GIS and multi-criteria
SAATY approach to study risks in transportation of
hazardous substances. This partner is WP4 leader
concerning environment vulnerability estimation,
which intends to use the same competence.
RIS0 i s experienced with both SEVESO Direc-
tives. It also coordinated the ASSURANCE project.
Furthermore, it is experienced in applying function-
oriented modeling to analyze the effectiveness of an
organization and its safety culture. RIS0 is WP3
leader dealing with Prevention management.
UROM is experienced in risk analyses and area
risk studies, linked in particular with the use of GIS.
Its activities in ARAMIS mainly concern the i nter-
faces to build up between the model developed for V
index and the use of GIS to represent this index.
CMI has a long experience both in fire and explo-
sion modeling and in the use of safety management
standards. In this respect, CMI works in WP2 to list
and select appropriate models for consequence mod-
eling, and in WP3 to analyze how the common man-
agement standards fit in the ARAMIS model.
TUD was a major partner of I-RISK project. It
brings its expertise to the project in safety manage-
ment modeling and auditing, and also in scenario
identification with the use of bow-tie approach.
IChemE-EPSC only participates in the dissemi-
nation process to other member companies or asso-
ciates from EPSC. It also cares about Industry par-
ticipation into the Parallel Review Team.
US is the largest Slovenian research organization.
VSB-TUO has been involved for long in Industrial
Environment Research, and has enlarged since 1995
its focus towards technological and natural risks.
Both institutes have been chosen to test the full
ARAMIS method in companies of their own country
and also to compare it to commonly used approaches
in their respective country.
7 CONCLUSIONS 9 REFERENCES
ARAMIS project supports the European Research
Area concerning knowledge improvement, encour-
agement of the Science-Industry dialogue and har-
monization in decision-making process related to
hazardous establishments.
The resulting method should indeed be proposed
as a recommended and harmonized tool used by risk
experts and recognized by risk-informed decision-
makers of EU competent authorities. Harmonizing
industrial risk assessment in Europe would signifi-
cantly contribute to the European Commission's
overall efforts to establish harmonized policies fol-
lowing the SEVESOII Directive.
For both Competent Authorities and Industry,
such a harmonized risk assessment procedure would
constitute first a useful comparison tool for indus-
trial sites, which integrates the strengths of both
probabilistic and deterministic approaches. The risk
assessment procedure would at last be linked to the
setup of progress plans within the framework of a
safety management system. It would also allow to
reach a consensus in the selection of accident sce-
narios that takes into account plant-specific safety
devices and safety management effectiveness, i.e.
suitable frequencies for the scenarios as required in a
safety report for risk control demonstration.
The participation of potential end-users in the
project from the start, in particular through the Par-
allel Review Team ensures that the ARAMIS project
will contribute on a very practical level to EC re-
search objectives and to consistent implementation
of European policies in major hazard prevention.
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